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Session arrangement will be subject to minor changes.
Plenary Sessions:

1. Matthew Jackson (Stanford University), *Repeated Games and Favor Exchange on Social Networks*, August 24, 08:30-09:30

2. Martin Shubik (Yale University), (availability to be confirmed) August 24, 13:15-14:15


**Session 1-A: Solutions (I)**
Session Chair: Yukihiko Funaki
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 

*Fair-ranking properties of a core selection and the Shapley value*
By Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University, and Boram Park, Seoul National University
Presented by: **Boram Park**, Seoul National University

*On the nucleolus for 2-convex TU games*
By Theo Driessen, University of Twente
Presented by: **Theo Driessen**, University of Twente

*A Non-cooperative and an Axiomatic Characterization of the AL-value*
By Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University, Takumi Kongo Graduate School of Economics, Waseda University, Rodica Branzei, Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University and Stef Tijs Tilburg University
Presented by: **Yukihiko Funaki**, Waseda University

*Matrix analysis for the Owen value*
By Genjiu Xu, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Hui Wang, Northwestern Polytechnical University, and Hao Sun, Northwestern Polytechnical University
Presented by: **Genjiu Xu**, Northwestern Polytechnical University

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**Session 1-B: IO I**
Session Chair: Shigeo Muto
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 

*Oligopoly Models*
By Ferenc Szidarovszky and Feiyue Wang, Systems and Industrial Engineering Department University of ArizonaTucson, Arizona
Presented by: **Ferenc Szidarovszky** Systems and Industrial Engineering Department University of ArizonaTucson, Arizona
**Branching deregulation and merger optimality**  
By Antonio J Morales, Universidad de Malaga and LINEEX, Miguel A Melendez-jimenez, Universidad de Malaga, and Ana Lozano-vivas, Universidad de Malaga  
Presented by: Antonio J Morales, Universidad de Malaga and LINEEX

**Fee versus royalty policy in licensing through bargaining: An application of the Nash bargaining solution**  
By Shigeo Muto, Tokyo Institute of Technology, and Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology  
Presented by: Shigeo Muto, Tokyo Institute of Technology

**On the Stability of the Cournot Solution: An Evolutionary Approach**  
By Marius-ionut Ochea, CentER, Dept. of Economics, Tilburg University  
Presented by: Marius-ionut Ochea, CentER, Dept. of Economics, Tilburg University

**Session 1-C: Social Choice I**  
Session Chair: Maurice Salles  
Date:  
Time:  
Location:  

**Are incentives against justice? (withdrawn)**  
By Rodrigo A. Velez, Texas A&M University  
Presented by: Rodrigo A. Velez, Texas A&M University

**Bargaining Models with Arbitration Committee**  
By Vladimir Mazalov, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research and Yulia Tokareva, Zabaikalsky State Humanitarian Pedagogical University.  
Presented by: Vladimir Mazalov, Institute of Applied Mathematical Research

**Fuzzy Political Campaigns**  
By Ming Li, Concordia University and Arianna Degan University of Quebec at Montreal  
Presented by: Ming Li, Concordia University,

**Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies**  
By Rene Van den brink, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam and Frank Steffen, University of Liverpool.  
Presented by: Rene Van den brink, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam
Session: Posters I

Trading Frequency and Volatility Clustering
By Yi Xue, school of international trade and economics, University of international business and economics, and Ramazan Gencay, Simon Fraser University
Presented by: Yi Xue, school of international trade and economics, University of international business and economics

Strategies in Repeated Plays ---Expert Selection Problem
By Mingfei Li, Bentley University
Presented by: Mingfei Li, Bentley University

Myopia in Contest: Accumulating Valuation All-Pay Auction Model and Experiment
By Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University, and Fangfang Tang, National School of Development, Peking University
Presented by: Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University

Evolutionary game theoretical analysis of persistence of discrepancy between attitude and behavior
By Takuya Sekiguchi, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Presented by: Takuya Sekiguchi, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Strategic Correlativity in Games
By John Wu, Business School, East China Normal University
Presented by: John Wu, Business School, East China Normal University

Time-consistent solutions in dynamic network games
By Artem Sedakov, St. Petersburg University, and Leon Petrosyan, St. Petersburg University
Presented by: Artem Sedakov, St. Petersburg University
Session 2-A: Solutions (II)
Session Chair: Chih Chang
Date:
Time:
Location:

Marginal monotonicity solution of NTU games
By Yan-an Hwang  Department of Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University
Presented by: Yan-an Hwang  Department of Mathematics, National Dong Hwa University

Balanced consistency and balanced cost reduction for sequencing problems
By Rene Van den brink, Department of Econometrics and Tinbergen Institute, Free University Amsterdam and Youngsub Chun, Seoul National University
Presented by: Youngsub Chun  Seoul National University

On the coincidence property
By Chih Chang, National Tsing Hua University
Presented by: Chih Chang, National Tsing Hua University

Session 2-B: Repeated Games
Session Chair: Bo Chen
Date:
Time:
Location:

A Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Unequal Discounting
By Bo Chen, Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, and Satoru Takahashi, Department of Economics, Princeton University
Presented by: Bo Chen, Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University

Repeated anonymous random matching games: community enforcement beyond the prisoner's dilemma
By Julio Gonzalez-diaz, University of Santiago de Compostela and Joyee Deb, New York University
Presented by: Julio Gonzalez-diaz, University of Santiago de Compostela

Optimal yardstick rules under infinitely repeated competition
Session 2-C: Information and Incentives
Session Chair: Chenghu Ma
Date:
Time:
Location:

Aggregation and (Constrained) Optimal Risk Sharing Rule in Incomplete Market
By Chenghu Ma, School of Management, Fudan University, and Jiankang Zhang, Carleton University
Presented by: Chenghu Ma, School of Management, Fudan University

Transfer of authority within hierarchy
By Pinghan Liang, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Presented by: Pinghan Liang, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona

Envy-free and incentive compatible division of a commodity
By Jung You, Rice University
Presented by: Jung You, Rice University

Session 3-A: Rationality I
Session Chair: Jeff Kline
Date:
Time:
Location:

Learning the new from reviewing the familiar
By Yiqing Xing, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University
Presented by: Yiqing Xing, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University

Almost common priors
By Ziv Hellman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Presented by: Ziv Hellman, Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Transpersonal understanding through social roles, and emergence of cooperation
By Jeff Kline, University of Queensland
Presented by: Jeff Kline, University of Queensland
**Session 3-B: Coalitional Games I**

Session Chair: [David Wettstein](mailto:David.Wettstein@UniversityOfCambridge.edu)

Date:
Time:
Location:

**Coalitional Stochastic Stability**

By Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge
Presented by: Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge

**Bargaining, Values and Implementation with Coalitional Externalities**

By David Wettstein, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Peter Borm, Tilburg University and Yuan Ju York University
Presented by: [David Wettstein](mailto:David.Wettstein@Ben-GurionUniversityOfTheNegev.edu), Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

**Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions**

By Fabien Lange, Keleti Faculty of Economics and László A. Kóczy, Keleti Faculty of Economics
Presented by: [Fabien Lange](mailto:Fabien.Lange@KeletiFacultyOfEconomics.edu), Keleti Faculty of Economics

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**Session 3-C: Matching**

Session Chair: Yuichiro Kamada

Date:
Time:
Location:

**Equitability in Matching Market Design with an Application to School Choice**

By Yusuke Narita, University of Tokyo, and Kentaro Tomoeda, Harvard University and University of Tokyo
Presented by: [Yusuke Narita](mailto:Yusuke.Narita@UniversityOfTokyo.edu), University of Tokyo

**Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of Japanese Resident Matching Program**

By Yuichiro Kamada, Harvard University, and Fuhito Kojima, Stanford University
Presented by: [Yuichiro Kamada](mailto:Yuichiro.Kamada@HarvardUniversity.edu), Harvard University

**Unanimity, Strategy-proofness, and Non-bossiness in Two-sided Matching Problems**

By Takumi Kongo, Waseda University
Presented by: [Takumi Kongo](mailto:Takumi.Kongo@WasedaUniversity.edu), Waseda University

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**Session 4-A: Coalitional Games II**
The Detalization of the Irrational Behavior Proof Condition for the Emission Reduction Game
By Leon Petrosyan, St. Petersburg University, David w. k. Yeung, Hong Kong Shue Yan University and Anna v. Iljina, St. Petersburg University.
Presented by: Leon Petrosyan, St. Petersburg University

Highway toll pricing
By Guixia Guo, Peking University, Baomin Dong, University of International Business and Economics, and Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor
Presented by: Guixia Guo, Peking University

Efficient allocation of water with incomplete information
By Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor and Hu Lu Health Canada
Presented by: Yuntong Wang, University of Windsor

Partial cooperative equilibrium models and applications to international environmental agreements
By Lina Mallozzi, Univerristy of Naples Federico II and Stef H. Tijs, University of Tilburg
Presented by: Lina Mallozzi, Univeristy of Naples Federico II

Session 4-B: Bargaining
Session Chair: Duozhe Li

Noncooperative Foundation of Nash Bargaining Solution in n-Person Games with Incomplete Information
By Toshiji Miyakawa, Osaka University of Economics
Presented by: Toshiji Miyakawa, Osaka University of Economics

One-to-Many Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol
By Duozhe Li, Chinese University of Hong Kong
Presented by: Duozhe Li, Chinese University of Hong Kong
An NTU game approach to patent licensing: stable bargaining outcomes under two licensing policies
By Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology
Presented by: Shin Kishimoto, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Session 4-C: Experimental I
Session Chair: Mamuro Kaneko
Date:
Time:
Location:

An Experimental Study from the Perspective of Inductive Game Theory
By Mamoru Kaneko, University of Tsukuba, Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences, Ai Takeuchi, Waseda University, Yukihiko Funaki, Waseda University and J. Jude Kline, University of Queensland
Presented by: Mamoru Kaneko, University of Tsukuba, Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences

Reputation and Cooperation: An Experiment on Prisoner's Dilemma with Second-order Information
By Binglin Gong, Fudan University and Chunlei Yang, Academia Sinica
Presented by: Binglin Gong, Fudan University

Stand by Me Help, Heterogeneity and Commitment in Experimental Coordination Games
By Enrique Fatas, University of Valencia, Jordi Brandts, Universitat Autónoma Barcelona and David J Cooper, Florida State University
Presented by: Enrique Fatas, University of Valencia

Session 4-D: Bayesian Games
Session Chair: Cheng-zhong Qin
Date:
Time:
Location:

An Explicit Approach to Modeling Finite-Order Type Spaces and Applications
By Cheng-zhong Qin, University of California at Santa Barbara, and Chun-lei Yang, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan
Presented by: Cheng-zhong Qin, University of California at Santa Barbara
Contracting with multiple agents, countervailing incentives, and industry structures
By Shinji Kobayashi, Nihon University, and Shigemi Oba, Nihon University
Presented by: Shinji Kobayashi, Nihon University

Existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in Markov games with strategic complementarities for finite actions and finite states
By Takahiro Watanabe and Hideaki Yamashita, Tokyo Metropolitan University
Presented by: Takahiro Watanabe, Tokyo Metropolitan University

Session 5-A: Coalition and Efficiency
Session Chair: Jingang Zhao
Date:
Time:
Location:

Estimating the Costs of Forming a Coalition: Methodology and the Case of the 1887-1914 Sugar Monopoly
By Jingang Zhao, University of Saskatchewan
Presented by: Jingang Zhao, University of Saskatchewan

The Motzkin's theorem and Pareto improving reforms
By Kwan koo Yun, SUNY at Albany
Presented by: Kwan koo Yun, SUNY at Albany

Vector Games
By Zhigang Cao and Xiaoguang Yang Academy of Mathematics and System Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences
Presented by: Zhigang Cao Academy of Mathematics and System Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Session 5-B: Social Choice II (Cancelled)
Session Chair: Rene Van den Brink
Date:
Time:
Location:

Session 5-C: Collective Decision Theory
Incomplete Contract and Divisional Structures
By Yongqin Wang, CCES, School of Economics, Fudan University and Te Bao CeNDEF, University of Amsterdam.
Presented by: Yongqin Wang, CCES, School of Economics, Fudan University

The evolution of bilateral free trade agreement networks
By Zhiwei Cui, Beihang University
Presented by: Zhiwei Cui, Beihang University

A Game Theoretic Analysis of China's Ongoing Land Institutional Change
By Chen Cheng, China Center for Economic Research PKU
Presented by: Chen Cheng, China Center for Economic Research PKU

Session 5-D: IO II
Session Chair: Andrey Garnaev

Naive learning and game play in a dual social network framework
By Zhengzheng Pan, Virginia Tech, and Robert P. Gilles, Queen's University, Belfast
Presented by: Zhengzheng Pan, Virginia Tech

How to set tariff
By Andrey Garnaev, Saint Petersburg State University
Presented by: Andrey Garnaev, Saint Petersburg State University

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model
By Mario Gilli, Department of Economics - University of Milan-Bicocca
Presented by: Mario Gilli, Department of Economics - University of Milan-Bicocca

Session 5-B IO III
Session Chair: Adam Wong

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Session Chair: Chenghu Ma
Date:
Time:
Location:
Fishy Gifts: Bribing with Shame and Guilt
By David Ong, Peking University
Presented by: David Ong, Peking University

Computational complexity of sequential pricing on social networks
By Bach Ha, Northwestern University, Hai Zhou, Northwestern University
Presented by: Hai Zhou, Northwestern University

The choice of the number of varieties: justifying simple mechanisms
By Chi leung (adam) Wong Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Presented by: Chi leung (adam) Wong Shanghai University of Finance and Economics

Session: Posters II
Date:
Time:
Location:

Multidimensional Connectivity and Cooperation
By Jose Vila, University of Valencia, Amparo Urbano, Universidad de Valencia, and Angel Sanchez, University Carlos III de Madrid
Presented by: Jose Vila, University of Valencia

Situation distribution in a 3-Person game in form k(2b-2,2b-1,2b) and the game of 3 players gambling coins
By Jiang Dianyu, Huaihai Institute of Technology
Presented by: Jiang Dianyu, Huaihai Institute of Technology

Impact of Matching Uncertainty on Dynamic Stability of Equilibria
By Ryota Iijima, Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo
Presented by: Ryota Iijima, Graduate School of Economics, the University of Tokyo

Payoffs Can be Inferred From Beliefs, Generically, When Beliefs Are Conditioned on Information
By Alia Gizatulina, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, and Martin Hellwig, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
Presented by: Alia Gizatulina, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Global games with endogenous information structure----a rational inattention approach
By Ming Yang, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University
Network structure and the emergence of value
By Xu Tan, PHD student at Stanford University, and Tomas Rodriguez-barraquer, PHD student at Stanford University
Presented by: Xu Tan, PHD student at Stanford University

The stronger player paradox
By Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO
Presented by: Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director UNIVERSIDAD DEL ROSARIO

On the non-traditional problems of portfolio theory
By Oleg Nikonov, Ural State Technical University-UPI, and Marina Medvedeva Ural State Technical University-UPI
Presented by: Nikonov, Ural State Technical University-UPI

Money, fame, or just for the sake of it: a real-effort experiment on incentives for employee participation
By Fan Wu, University of Magdeburg, Birgitta Wolff, University of Magdeburg, and Silke Nagel, AOK Sachsen-Anhalt
Presented by: Fan Wu, University of Magdeburg

Session 6-A: Experimental II
Session Chair: Tatsuyoshi Saijo

Theoretical and experimental investigation of performance of keyword auction mechanisms
By Emiko Fukuda, National Defense Academy of Japan, Yoshio Kamijo, Ai Takeuchi, Waseda University, Michiharu Masui, Tokyo Institute of Technology and Yukihiro Funaki Waseda University.
Presented by: Emiko Fukuda, National Defense Academy of Japan

Reward distribution within a wining team
By Mingli Zheng, Univeristy of Macau
Presented by: Mingli Zheng, Univeristy of Macau

A Solution to Prisoner's Dilemma: 100% Cooperation in the Experiment with Approval Stage
Session 6-B: Coalitional Games IV

Cooperative game theory based on Convex Analysis: The (Pre)Kernel and the Fenchel-Moreau Conjugation
By Holger Ingmar Meinhardt, University of Karlsruhe
Presented by: Holger Ingmar Meinhardt, University of Karlsruhe

Tolerable extreme and efficient compromise in negotiation with binary choice
By Yuan Ju, University of York
Presented by: Yuan Ju, University of York

Values for cycle-free directed graph games
By Anna Khmelnitskaya, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Dolf Talman, Tilburg University
Presented by: Anna Khmelnitskaya, St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences

Session 6-C: Networks

Communication, coordination and networks
By Jihong Lee, Yonsei university, and Syngjoo Choi, University College London
Presented by: Jihong Lee, Yonsei university

Strategic guanxi behavior in Chinese entrepreneurs: a network approach
By Ivan Arribas, University of Valencia, and José E Vila, University of Valencia
Presented by: Ivan Arribas, University of Valencia

Characterization of Separating Equilibria in a Signaling Game with a Continuum of Types: A Network Approach
Session 6-D: Rationality II
Session Chair: Ori Haimanko
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 

**Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change**
By Ori Haimanko, Ben-Gurion University, Ezra Einy, Ben-Gurion University, and Biligbaatar Tumendemberel, SUNY at Stony Brook
Presented by: Ori Haimanko, Ben-Gurion University

**Individual Expectation, Limited Rationality and Aggregate Outcomes**
By Te Bao, CeNDEF, School of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam, Cars Hommes, Joep Sonnemans and Jan Tuinstra University of Amsterdam
Presented by: Te Bao, CeNDEF, School of Economics and Business, University of Amsterdam

**Purification, Saturation and the Exact Law of Large Numbers**
By Yongchao Zhang, National Univ. Singapore and Jianwei Wang, Univ. Science and Tech. China
Presented by: Yongchao Zhang, National Univ. Singapore

Session 7-A: Auctions and Contests
Session Chair: Qian Jiao
Date: 
Time: 
Location: 

**Myopia in Contest: Accumulating Valuation All-Pay Auction Model and Experiment**
By Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University, and Fangfang Tang, National School of Development, Peking University
Presented by: Zemin Zhong, HSBC School of Business, Peking University

**Auctioning the right to play ultimatum games: the impact on equilibrium selection, strategic uncertainty and the structure of social preferences**
By Jason Shachat, WISE, Xiamen University and J. Todd Swarthout, Georgia State University
Presented by: Jason Shachat, WISE, Xiamen University

Contest design with endogenous entry: Disclosure of number of contestants and choice of contest technology
By Qian Jiao, National University of Singapore and Qiang Fu and Jingfeng Lu, National University of Singapore
Presented by: Qian Jiao, National University of Singapore

Session 7-B: Nash Program
Session Chair: Hans Peters
Date:
Time:
Location:

Non-cooperative convergence to the core in Nash demand games without random errors or convexity assumptions
By Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge
Presented by: Jonathan Newton, University of Cambridge

Non-cooperative approaches to claims or bankruptcy problems
By Hans Peters, Maastricht University
Presented by: Hans Peters, Maastricht University

N-person cooperative games strategic-equilibrium
By Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director Universidad Del Rosario
Presented by: Gabriel Julio Turbay, Former Research Director Universidad Del Rosario

Session 7-C: IO and Behavioral
Session Chair: Qiang Fu
Date:
Time:
Location:

Self-Esteem, Shame and Personal Motivation
By Xiaojian Zhao, University of Mannheim and Roberta Dessi, Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI) and CEP
Presented by: Xiaojian Zhao, University of Mannheim
Can Forgetfullness Make Us Better Off?
By Jie Zheng, Washington University in St. Louis
Presented by: Jie Zheng, Washington University in St. Louis

Policy Making with Reputation Concerns
By Qiang Fu, National University of Singapore and Ming Li, Concordia University.
Presented by: Qiang Fu, National University of Singapore

Session 7-D: Solutions III
Session Chair: Marina Nunez
Date:
Time:
Location:

On the computation of the Shapley Value
By Irinel Chiril Dragan, University of Texas
Presented by: Irinel Chiril Dragan, University of Texas

Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions in the assignment market
By Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona, and Carles Rafels, Universitat de Barcelona
Presented by: Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona

Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games- An extension of the Results of Qin (1993)
By Sonja Brangewitz and Jan-Philip Gamp Economic Behavior & Interaction Models
Presented by: Sonja Brangewitz and Jan-Philip Gamp Economic Behavior & Interaction Models

Session 7-E: Late submissions
Session Chair:
Date:
Time:
Location:

An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form
By Anindya Bhattacharya, UNIVERSITY OF YORK, and Victoria Brosi, University of York
Presented by: Anindya Bhattacharya, UNIVERSITY OF YORK
Assignment markets with the same core
Carles Rafels, University of Barcelona, Javier Martinez de albeniz University of Barcelona, Marina Nunez, University of Barcelona
Presented by: Carles Rafels, University of Barcelona

Experimentation in an equilibrium labor market with Directed On-the-job Search
By Li Fei Univerisity of Pennsylvania
Presented by: Li Fei Univerisity of Pennsylvania