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Corrigendum, public goods games, altruism, and evolution

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Abstract

(No abstract)

Corrigendum: Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution

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Abstract

In this note I correct a proposition in an article that I published recently in this journal, a correction which is related to a second-order condition for evolutionary stability.

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In Alger (2010), Proposition 6 should read

Proposition 6 *If $\sigma = 1$, then $\alpha^* = 1$ is the only potential evolutionarily stable degree of altruism. For any $\sigma \in [0, 1)$, any locally evolutionarily stable degree of altruism $\alpha^* \in A$ is such that $\alpha^* < \sigma$.*

This slight reformulation is related to a second-order condition for evolutionary stability in Proposition 5, which was based on a proposition in a draft of Alger and Weibull (2010), subsequently reformulated—see the published version. This change does not affect the numerical results.

References

- Alger, Ingela. 2010. “Public Goods Games, Altruism, and Evolution,” *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, 12:789-813.
- Alger, Ingela and Jörgen W. Weibull. 2010. “Kinship, Incentives, and Evolution,” *American Economic Review*, 100:1727-1760.