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Appendix

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Appendix

Proof of Proposition 1. Let $\Gamma < (1+r)W_1$. Then there are two cases that can occur

$$(P1): W_{2b} \geq \Gamma, W_{2g} \geq \Gamma \text{ for } 0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(r-x_b)W_1}$$

$$(P2): W_{2b} < \Gamma, W_{2g} \geq \Gamma \text{ for } \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(r-x_b)W_1} < \alpha \leq \alpha_U$$

The corresponding problems are

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{\alpha} : & \mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma) = pU_G(W_{2g} - \Gamma) + (1-p)U_G(W_{2b} - \Gamma)) \\ & = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \{p[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{1-\gamma} \\ & \quad + (1-p)[-(r-x_b)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{1-\gamma}\} \\ \text{such that : } & 0 \leq \alpha \leq \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(r-x_b)W_1} \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (P1)$$

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{Max}_{\alpha} : & \mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma) = pU_G(W_{2g} - \Gamma) + (1-p)\lambda U_L(W_{2b} - \Gamma)) \\ & = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \{p[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{1-\gamma} \\ & \quad - \lambda(1-p)[(r-x_b)W_1\alpha - (1+r)W_1 + \Gamma]^{1-\gamma}\} \\ \text{such that : } & \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(r-x_b)W_1} < \alpha \leq \alpha_U \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (P2)$$

The idea of the proof is to show that (P1) is a concave programming problem with the global maximum being α^* as defined by (4) which is such that $0 \leq \alpha^* \leq \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(r-x_b)W_1}$ and the utility of (P2) is decreasing for $\lambda > 1/K_\gamma$ that is the assumption of Proposition 1. The first order conditions (FOC) for (P1) are

$$p[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{-\gamma}(x_g - r) - (1-p)[-(r-x_b)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{-\gamma}(r-x_b) = 0$$

or alternatively

$$\frac{p}{1-p} \left[\frac{-(r-x_b)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma} \right]^\gamma = \frac{r-x_b}{x_g - r}$$

where the left hand side, as shown below, is the MRS and the right hand side is the market trade-off as given by its definition. It can be shown that the second order conditions are satisfied which implies that (P1) is a concave problem. Finally, it can be seen that

$$\alpha^* = \frac{\left(1 - K_0^{1/\gamma}\right)}{r - x_b + K_0^{1/\gamma}(x_g - r)} \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{W_1}$$

satisfies the FOC and that $0 \leq \alpha^* \leq \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(r-x_b)W_1}$. Note that $\alpha^* > 0$ follows from assumption $\mathbb{E}(x) > r$ which implies that $K_0 < 1$.

Regarding problem (P2), note that

$$\begin{aligned} 1/K_\gamma &= \frac{p(x_g - r)^{1-\gamma}}{(1-p)(r-x_b)^{1-\gamma}} = \frac{p[(r-x_b)W_1\alpha]^\gamma(x_g - r)}{(1-p)[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha]^\gamma(r-x_b)} \\ &> \frac{p[(r-x_b)W_1\alpha - (1+r)W_1 + \Gamma]^\gamma(x_g - r)}{(1-p)[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^\gamma(r-x_b)} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, based on this and $\lambda > 1/K_\gamma$ it follows that

$$\lambda > \frac{p[(r-x_b)W_1\alpha - (1+r)W_1 + \Gamma]^\gamma(x_g - r)}{(1-p)[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^\gamma(r-x_b)}$$

and consequently

$$\frac{d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma_2))}{d\alpha} < 0$$

implying that the utility of (P2) is a decreasing function in α .

The MRS for (P1) can be obtained as follows: We derive $d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))$ and from equation $d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma)) = 0$ express the MRS. Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma)) &= p[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{-\gamma} d(W_{2g} - \Gamma) \\ &\quad + (1-p)[-(r-x_b)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{-\gamma} d(W_{2b} - \Gamma) \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

This implies that for (P1)

$$\left. \frac{d(W_{2b} - \Gamma)}{d(W_{2g} - \Gamma)} \right|_{\alpha \in \left[0, \frac{(1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(r-x_b)W_1}\right]} = -\frac{p}{1-p} \left[\frac{-(r-x_b)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma}{(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma} \right]^\gamma$$

■

Proof of Proposition 2. At first we re-formulate the statement of Proposition 2 in more detail where the MRS is considered for $\lambda \in (0, \alpha_U]$.

Let $\Gamma = (1+r)W_1$. Then problem (2) obtains its maximum (maxima) α^* as follows

- (i) $\alpha^* = \alpha_U$ for $MRS > \frac{r-x_b}{x_g-r}$ and $p > p_\gamma$
- (ii) $\alpha^* \in [0, \alpha_U]$ for $MRS = \frac{r-x_b}{x_g-r}$ and $p > p_\gamma$
- (iii) $\alpha^* = 0$ for $MRS < \frac{r-x_b}{x_g-r}$

Note that $\alpha^* > 0$ for $MRS > \frac{r-x_b}{x_g-r}$ and $p > p_\gamma$.

Based on the domain of α , there is only one case that can occur: $0 \leq W_{2b} \leq \Gamma$ and $W_{2g} \geq \Gamma$. Thus, the corresponding problem we would like to solve is

$$\left. \begin{aligned} \text{Max}_\alpha : & \quad pU_G(W_{2g} - \Gamma) + (1-p)\lambda U_L(W_{2b} - \Gamma) = \\ & \quad \frac{(W_1\alpha)^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} [p(x_g - r)^{1-\gamma} - \lambda(1-p)(r-x_b)^{1-\gamma}] \end{aligned} \right\} \quad (\text{P2})$$

such that : $0 \leq \alpha \leq \alpha_U$

The MRS for (P2) can be obtained as follows: We derive $d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))$ and from equation $d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma)) = 0$ express the MRS. Thus,

$$d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma)) = p[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha]^{-\gamma} d(W_{2g} - \Gamma) + \lambda(1-p)[-(r - x_b)W_1\alpha]^{-\gamma} d(W_{2b} - \Gamma) = 0$$

This implies that for (P2)

$$\left. \frac{d(W_{2b} - \Gamma)}{d(W_{2g} - \Gamma)} \right|_{\alpha \in [0, \alpha_U]} = -\frac{p}{1-p} \left[\frac{r - x_b}{x_g - r} \right]^\gamma \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

and thus the $MRS = \frac{p}{1-p} \left[\frac{r - x_b}{x_g - r} \right]^\gamma \frac{1}{\lambda}$.

Case (i): Note that $MRS > \frac{r - x_b}{x_g - r}$ implies that

$$p(x_g - r)^{1-\gamma} - \lambda(1-p)(r - x_b)^{1-\gamma} > 0 \quad (\text{A1})$$

and thus the objective function of problem (P2) is increasing at its domain. Based on this and the fact that objective function of (P2) is zero for $\alpha = 0$ it follows that in case (i) the objective function $\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))$ is increasing in its domain and thus $\alpha^* = \alpha_U$. Note that $MRS > \frac{r - x_b}{x_g - r}$ can hold only when $1 < \lambda < 1/K_\gamma$ and $p > p_\gamma$.

Case (ii): Note that $MRS = \frac{r - x_b}{x_g - r}$ implies that

$$p(x_g - r)^{1-\gamma} - \lambda(1-p)(r - x_b)^{1-\gamma} = 0$$

and thus the objective function of (P2) is constant (namely zero) in its domain. Thus, in case (ii) the objective function $\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))$ has its maxima in $[0, \alpha_U]$.

Case (iii): Note that $MRS < \frac{r - x_b}{x_g - r}$ implies that

$$p(x_g - r)^{1-\gamma} - \lambda(1-p)(r - x_b)^{1-\gamma} < 0$$

and thus the objective function of (P2) is decreasing at its domain. In summary, the objective function $\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))$ has its maxima at zero, i.e., $\alpha^* = 0$.

Note finally that cases (A1) and (A2) can happen for $\lambda > 1$ only when $K_\gamma < 1$ and thus when $p > p_\gamma$. ■

Proof of Proposition 3. Let $\Gamma > (1+r)W_1$. Then there are again two cases that can occur

$$(P3) \quad W_{2b} < \Gamma, \quad W_{2g} < \Gamma \quad \text{for } 0 \leq \alpha \leq \min \left\{ \frac{\Gamma - (1+r)W_1}{(x_g - r)W_1}, \alpha_U \right\}$$

$$(P4) \quad W_{2b} < \Gamma, \quad W_{2g} \geq \Gamma \quad \text{for } \frac{\Gamma - (1+r)W_1}{(x_g - r)W_1} < \alpha \leq \alpha_U \quad \text{if } \Gamma \leq (1+r)W_1 \frac{x_g - x_b}{r - x_b}$$

and thus the corresponding problems are

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{Max}_{\alpha} : \quad p\lambda U_L(W_{2g} - \Gamma) + (1-p)\lambda U_L(W_{2b} - \Gamma) \\
& \quad = \quad -\frac{1}{1-\gamma}\lambda p[-(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + \Gamma - (1+r)W_1]^{1-\gamma} + \\
& \quad \quad -\frac{1}{1-\gamma}\lambda(1-p)[(r - x_b)W_1\alpha + \Gamma - (1+r)W_1]^{1-\gamma} \\
& \text{such that :} \quad 0 \leq \alpha \leq \min \left\{ \frac{\Gamma - (1+r)W_1}{(x_g - r)W_1}, \alpha_U \right\}
\end{aligned} \tag{P3}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{Max}_{\alpha} : \quad pU_G(W_{2g} - \Gamma) + (1-p)\lambda U_L(W_{2b} - \Gamma) \\
& \quad = \quad \frac{1}{1-\gamma}p[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{1-\gamma} \\
& \quad \quad -\frac{1}{1-\gamma}\lambda(1-p)[(r - x_b)W_1\alpha + \Gamma - (1+r)W_1]^{1-\gamma} \\
& \text{such that :} \quad \frac{\Gamma - (1+r)W_1}{(x_g - r)W_1} < \alpha \leq \alpha_U \quad \text{and if } \Gamma \leq (1+r)W_1 \frac{x_g - x_b}{r - x_b}
\end{aligned} \tag{P4}$$

Note that (P4) is the same as (P2) except for a different set of feasible solutions. (P3) is a convex programming problem (in α) and thus its maximum will be reached at one of the end points. The first order conditions for (P4) are

$$p[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{-\gamma}(x_g - r) - \lambda(1-p)[(r - x_b)W_1\alpha - (1+r)W_1 + \Gamma]^{-\gamma}(r - x_b) = 0$$

or alternatively

$$\frac{p}{\lambda(1-p)} \left[\frac{(r - x_b)W_1\alpha - (1+r)W_1 + \Gamma}{(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma} \right]^{\gamma} = \frac{r - x_b}{x_g - r}$$

where the left hand side, as shown below, is the MRS and the right hand side is the market trade-off. It can be easily verified that α^* given by (8) satisfies the FOC. In addition

$$\frac{d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))}{d\alpha} > 0 \quad \text{for } \alpha < \alpha^* \tag{A2}$$

$$\frac{d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))}{d\alpha} < 0 \quad \text{for } \alpha > \alpha^* \tag{A3}$$

which implies that $\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))$ reaches its maximum at α^* . In more detail, if $\frac{d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))}{d\alpha} > 0$ then

$$(p(x_g - r))^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}[(r - x_b)W_1\alpha - (1+r)W_1 + \Gamma] > (\lambda(1-p)(r - x_b))^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}[(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1+r)W_1 - \Gamma]$$

and simple derivations show that the last inequality follows from $\alpha < \alpha^*$ and $\lambda > \frac{1}{K_{\gamma}}$ which thus proves (A2). Inequality (A3) can be shown in a similar matter. It can be easily checked that $\alpha^* < \alpha_U$ for $\Gamma < \Gamma_U$ and thus $\alpha^* = \alpha_U$ for $\Gamma \geq \Gamma_U$.

To calculate the MRS for (P4) we again derive $d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma))$ and from equation $d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma)) = 0$ express the MRS, i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} d\mathbb{E}(U_{LA}(W_2 - \Gamma)) &= p [(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1 + r)W_1 - \Gamma]^{-\gamma} d(W_{2g} - \Gamma) \\ &\quad - \lambda(1 - p) [(r - x_b)W_1\alpha - (1 + r)W_1 + \Gamma]^{-\gamma} d(\Gamma - W_{2b}) \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

which implies

$$\frac{d(\Gamma - W_{2b})}{d(W_{2g} - \Gamma)} \Big|_{\frac{\Gamma - (1+r)W_1}{(x_g - r)W_1} < \alpha \leq \alpha_U} = \frac{p}{1 - p} \left[\frac{(r - x_b)W_1\alpha - (1 + r)W_1 + \Gamma}{(x_g - r)W_1\alpha + (1 + r)W_1 - \Gamma} \right]^\gamma \frac{1}{\lambda}$$

■