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Botao Qin, Jason F Shogren and Thorsten Janus
 
''The effects of social norm sensitivity in a PES mechanism''
( 2025, Vol. 45 No.2 )
 
 
In this paper, we study the effects of heterogeneous sensitivities to social norms when an environmental regulator designs a mechanism for land retirement. We show that when the social norm exceeds the personal norm, as expected, landowners who are relatively sensitive to social norms (``conformists") retire more land. However, when the social norm is below the personal norm, landowners who are more sensitive to personal norms (``individualists") conserve more. Endogenizing the social norm shows that the efficient provider might not supply the efficient quantity of land retirement.
 
 
Keywords: Social norms, Mechanism design, Payment for environmental services, Asymmetric information
JEL: D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Q5 - Environmental Economics: General
 
Manuscript Received : Aug 17 2024 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 30 2025

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