All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

 
Gökhan Can
 
''Overlapping ownership in a unionized oligopoly''
( 2025, Vol. 0 No.0 )
 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of overlapping ownership in a unionized Cournot duopoly with decreasing returns to labor. Firms partially internalize rivals' profits, and wage rates are set by firm-level unions that maximize total wage bills. An increase in overlapping ownership always increases producer surplus but lowers total union utility through a reduction in equilibrium wage rates. When products are close substitutes, both consumer surplus and social welfare exhibit a U-shaped relationship with respect to the degree of overlapping ownership. By contrast, when products are not close substitutes, overlapping ownership lowers consumer surplus and social welfare.
 
 
Keywords: Overlapping ownership, Unionized oligopoly, Decreasing returns to labor, Cournot competition, Product differentiation
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 07 2025 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 16 2025

  This abstract has been downloaded 8 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 191851 times