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Helene Ferrer, Guillermo Owen and Fabrice Valognes
 
''Endogenous coalitions formations through technology transfers and fair prices''
( 2026, Vol. 46 No.1 )
 
 
We consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Dreze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these "licensing coalitions".
 
 
Keywords: Cooperative games, coalitions formation, Aumann-Dreze prices, oligopoly
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 01 2025 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 30 2026

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