|
| |
| David T Yi |
| |
| ''Valence, abstention, and electoral competition'' |
| ( 2025, Vol. 45 No.1 ) |
| |
| |
| We present a simple two-candidate electoral competition model in which one candidate has a valence advantage and voters have option to abstain. We show that complete policy convergence and complete policy divergence as well as partial policy divergence arise as pure strategy Nash equilibria when certain conditions between valence advantage and abstention rates are satisfied. These results highlight the importance of understanding the interactions between the valence advantage and voter abstention in understanding candidates strategic behavior in electoral competition. |
| |
| |
| Keywords: Electoral Competition, Valence Advantage, Abstention Rate, Policy Divergence, Policy Convergence |
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory |
| |
| Manuscript Received : Jan 27 2025 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 30 2025 |
|
