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| Catherine C. Eckel, Enrique Fatas and Rick K. Wilson |
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| ''Cooperation and status in organizations'' |
| ( 2010, Vol. 12 No.4 ) |
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| We report the results of experiments designed to examine the effect of social status on contributions to a public good, with and without punishment. The experiments are conducted in 4-person groups in a “star” network, where one central player observes and is observed by the others. This imposes a social structure on the game, and gives the central player a leadership role in the group, simply by virtue of being commonly-observed. We further manipulate status by allocating the central position to the person who earns the highest, or the lowest, score on a trivia quiz. These high-status and low-status treatments are compared to a baseline case where the central position is randomly allocated (random status). We find that the effect of organizational structure – the existence of a central position – depends on the status of the central player. Higher status players are attended to and mimicked more systematically. Punishment has differential effects in the three treatments, and is least effective in the high-status case. |
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| Keywords: public good, social status, social network, leadership, punishment |
JEL: H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
C9 - Design of Experiments: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Jan 27 2009 | | Manuscript Accepted : Mar 08 2012 |
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