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ralph lauren polo

Emerson Melo
''Congestion pricing and learning in traffic network games''
A stochastic model describing the learning process and adaptive behavior of finitely many users in a congested traffic network with parallel links is used to prove convergence almost surely towards an efficient equilibrium for a related game. To prove this result we assume that the social planner charges on every route the marginal cost pricing without knowing what is the efficient equilibrium. The result is a dynamic version of Pigou''s solution, where the implementation is made in a decentralized way and the information about players gathered by the social planner is minimal. Our result and setting may be extended to the general case of negative externalities.
Keywords: Congestion pricing, traffic games, learning, stochastic algorithms.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
A1 - General Economics: General
Manuscript Received : Feb 20 2009 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 20 2009

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