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| Emerson Melo |
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| ''Congestion pricing and learning in traffic network games'' |
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| A stochastic model describing the learning process and adaptive
behavior of finitely many users in a congested traffic network with
parallel links is used to prove convergence almost surely towards an
efficient equilibrium for a related game. To prove this result we
assume that the social planner charges on every route the marginal
cost pricing without knowing what is the efficient equilibrium. The
result is a dynamic version of Pigou''s solution, where the
implementation is made in a decentralized way and the information
about players gathered by the social planner is minimal. Our result
and setting may be extended to the general case of negative
externalities.
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| Keywords: Congestion pricing, traffic games, learning, stochastic algorithms. |
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
A1 - General Economics: General |
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| Manuscript Received : Feb 20 2009 | | Manuscript Accepted : Feb 20 2009 |
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