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ralph lauren polo

Martin Van der linden
''Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoes''
Many mechanisms used to select a committee of k members out of a candidates endow voters with some veto power over candidates. Impossibility results are provided showing that, in most cases, even limited veto power implies that the mechanism is not strategy-proof. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed.
Keywords: Mechanism design, Strategy-proofness, Veto, Probabilistic mechanism, Committee selection
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 19 2016 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 21 2016

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