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Eric W Bond and Kamal Saggi
''Compulsory licensing and patent protection: a North-South perspective''
In a stylized model involving a developing country (called South) and a foreign patent-holder, we analyze whether and how the incidence and social value of compulsory licensing (CL) depends upon the South's patent protection policy. If South is free to deny patent protection, CL fails to arise in equilibrium and the option to use it makes both parties worse off. If South is obligated to offer patent protection, CL can occur and even yield a Pareto improvement. The ability to control price increases the South's incentive for patent protection as well as the likelihood of CL.
Keywords: Patented Products, Compulsory Licensing, Imitation, TRIPS, Quality, Welfare.
JEL: O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development: General
F2 - International Factor Movements and International Business: General
Manuscript Received : Mar 05 2016 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 13 2016

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