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ralph lauren polo

 
Martin Van der linden
 
''Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable''
 
 
This paper shows that the deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) cannot be improved upon in terms of manipulability in the sense of either Pathak and Sönmez (2013) or or Arribillaga and Massó (2015) without compromising with stability.A conflict between manipulability and fairness is also identified. It is shown that miniworst stable mechanisms that make the set of individuals who match with their worst achievable mate minimal are maximally manipulable among the stable mechanisms. Miniworst mechanisms are also more manipulable than DA in the sense of Arribillaga and Massó (2015). A similar conflict between fairness and manipulability is identified in the case of the median stable mechanism (Teo and Sethuraman, 1998).
 
 
Keywords: matching, deferred acceptance, manipulability, one-to-one matching.
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 19 2016 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 21 2016

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