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Paul H. Edelman and John A Weymark
 
''Unrestricted Domain Extensions of Dominant Strategy Implementable Allocation Functions''
 
 
It is shown that any one-person dominant strategy implementable allocation function on a restricted domain of types can be extended to the unrestricted domain in such a way that dominant strategy implementability is preserved when utility is quasilinear. A sufficient condition is identified for which this extension is essentially unique.
 
 
Keywords: dominant strategy incentive compatible, implementation theory, mechanism design
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 26 2018 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 27 2018

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