All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Ori Haimanko
 
''Payoffs in Non-Differentiable Perfectly Competitive TU Economies''
( 2001, Vol. 28 No.8 )
 
 
We show that a single-valued solution of non-atomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underlying them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection).
 
 
Keywords:
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 01 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 01 2001

  This abstract has been downloaded 714 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87689 times