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Moulin Hervé and Anna Bogomolnaia
''Random Matching and assignment under dichotomous preferences''
( 2001, Vol. 28 No.19 )
We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants gives a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate accross all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market. Our results apply to the random assignment problem as well.
Manuscript Received : Oct 18 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 18 2001

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