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Moulin Hervé and Anna Bogomolnaia
 
''Random Matching and assignment under dichotomous preferences''
( 2001, Vol. 28 No.19 )
 
 
We consider bilateral matching problems where each person views those on the other side of the market as either acceptable or unacceptable: an acceptable mate is preferred to remaining single, and the latter to an unacceptable mate all acceptable mates are welfare-wise identical. Using randomization, many efficient and fair matching methods define strategyproof revelation mechanisms. Randomly selecting a priority ordering of the participants gives a simple example. Equalizing as much as possible the probability of getting an acceptable mate accross all participants stands out for its normative and incentives properties: the profile of probabilities is Lorenz dominant, and the revelation mechanism is groupstrategyproof for each side of the market. Our results apply to the random assignment problem as well.
 
 
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Manuscript Received : Oct 18 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 18 2001

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