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Roberto Serrano and Sandeep Baliga
 
''Multilateral negotiations with private side-deals: a multiplicity example''
( 2001, Vol. 3 No.1 )
 
 
We study a multilateral negotiation procedure that allows for "partial agreements" in which responders are told only their own shares. Applications of our model include negotiations under "joint and several liability." Unlike previous models of multilateral bargaining with exit, we find that there are multiple equilibrium outcomes.
 
 
Keywords: imperfect information
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Feb 19 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 19 2001

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