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Philippe Jehiel and Benny Moldovanu
 
''A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions''
( 2001, Vol. 3 No.2 )
 
 
Combining the result of Palfrey (1983) about the role of bundling and the revenue equivalence theorem, this note shows that there is a conflict between revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions even with symmetric bidders.
 
 
Keywords: efficiency
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 30 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 30 2001

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