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Antonio Quesada
''On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria''
( 2001, Vol. 3 No.5 )
It is argued that if an out-of-equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to justify, in some extensive form game, the non-existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium.
Keywords: Extensive form game
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 06 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 06 2001

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