|
| |
| Antonio Quesada |
| |
| ''On the existence of self-enforcing equilibria'' |
| ( 2001, Vol. 3 No.5 ) |
| |
| |
| It is argued that if an out-of-equilibrium player observing a deviation from a presumed strategically stable path of play believes that a player also observing the deviation is more likely to deviate than a player who does not observe the deviation then it is possible to justify, in some extensive form game, the non-existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium. |
| |
| |
| Keywords: Extensive form game |
JEL:
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General |
| |
| Manuscript Received : Jul 06 2001 | | Manuscript Accepted : Jul 06 2001 |
|
