All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

 
Steffen Huck and Brian Wallace
 
''Reciprocal strategies and aspiration levels in a Cournot-Stackelberg experiment''
( 2002, Vol. 3 No.3 )
 
 
We examine behavior in Cournot and Stackelberg markets in a simple experiment where participants experience both market forms. Moreover, Stackelberg followers have to submit full response strategies. Our main finding is that Stackelberg followers employ rather flat, reciprocal response function, i.e., they punish leaders in who try to exploit their strategic adavantage and are willing to cooperate with cooperative leaders. Also, it turns out that prior exposure to a symmetric market makes followers more aggressive which hints at the role of aspiration levels in markets.
 
 
Keywords: aspiration levels
JEL: C9 - Design of Experiments: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 04 2002 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 04 2002

  This abstract has been downloaded 2047 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 164824 times