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ralph lauren polo

 
Gareth Myles
 
''Taxation and international oligopoly''
( 2001, Vol. 8 No.4 )
 
 
The combined use of specific and ad valorem taxation as a policy response to the welfare losses caused by international oligopoly is explored. With Nash competition between countries, taxation is inferior to quantity control. In contrast, when countries cooperate production control and taxation lead to identical outcomes. If a single country regulates the oligopoly, taxation can strictly dominate production control.
 
 
Keywords: oligopoly
JEL: H0 - Public Economics: General
H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 04 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 04 2001

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