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Leonard J. Mirman, Thomas Jeitschko and Neelam Jain
 
''Financial Intermediation and Entry-Deterrence: A survey''
( 2001, Vol. 12 No.1 )
 
 
In this paper, we summarize the findings of a series of our papers on the relationship between financial contracting and the game of entry-deterrence in a dynamic context.The incumbent has private information about its cost and enters into an agency relationship with a lender in each of the two periods. We examine the effect of this agency relationship on the probability of entry and limit pricing on the one hand and the effect of the game of entry-deterrence on the form of the financial contract on the other. The three papers make different assumptions about the uncertainty of demand and the informational structure.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L0 - Industrial Organization: General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 18 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 18 2001

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