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Iñaki Aguirre and Ana M. Martin
''On the strategic choice of spatial price policy: the role of the pricing game rules.''
( 2001, Vol. 12 No.2 )
The strategic choice of spatial price policy under duopoly crucially depends on the rules of price competition. We show that under simultaneous price competition and under leader-follower price competition (with the discriminatory firm being the leader), the pricing policy game is not, as stated by Thisse and Vives (1988), a Prisoner's Dilemma.
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : May 24 2001 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 25 2001

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