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ralph lauren polo

 
Xiaopeng Xu
 
''International best-shot public goods and foreign aid''
( 2002, Vol. 3 No.13 )
 
 
This note corrects an analytical mistake of Jayaraman and Kanbur (1999) in their analysis of a Stackelberg game of the voluntary contribution to an international best-shot public good by a donor and a recipient. It shows that, depending on players' preferences, the donor may choose not to contribute but make a positive direct income transfer to the recipient who will then contribute to the best-shot public good.
 
 
Keywords: best-shot public goods
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 16 2002 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 17 2002

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