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Gonzalo Olcina, Antoni Cunyat and Vicent Calabuig
 
''Bargaining with partially revocable commitments: a simple model''
( 2002, Vol. 3 No.30 )
 
 
Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. We examine the robustness of this result to the presence of a much more general class of commitments: partially revocable commitments.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 22 2002 Manuscript Accepted : Dec 13 2002

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