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ralph lauren polo

 
Xiaopeng Xu
 
''Threshold levels and the realization of a group benefit''
( 2002, Vol. 3 No.16 )
 
 
This paper considers a voluntary contribution threshold game in which a group benefit is realized only if the number of contributors at least reaches a threshold level, and analyzes the effect of the threshold level on the likelihood that the group benefit is realized. Changes in the threshold level in interior symmetric equilibrium have two effects on the likelihood, the direct, threshold effect and the indirect, strategic effect. While the direct effect is always negative, the indirect effect can be either positive or negative. And the net effect is not necessarily negative.
 
 
Keywords: direct effect
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 03 2002 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 04 2002

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