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ralph lauren polo

 
Arthur J. Robson and Philip J. Reny
 
''Existence of subgame perfect equilibrium with public randomization: A short proof''
( 2002, Vol. 3 No.24 )
 
 
Consider a multi-stage game where each player has a compact choice set and payoffs are continuous in all such choices. Harris, Reny and Robson (1995) prove existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium as long as a public correlation device is added to each stage. They achieve this by showing that the subgame perfect equilibium path correspondence is upper hemicontinuous. The present paper gives a short proof of existence that focuses on equilibrium payoffs rather than paths.
 
 
Keywords: Existence
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 11 2002 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 11 2002

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