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Rod Garratt and Cheng-Zhong Qin
 
''On cooperation structures resulting from simultaneous proposals''
( 2003, Vol. 3 No.5 )
 
 
This paper looks at cooperation structures that result from a strategic game where players make simultaneous proposals for cooperation. We identify cooperation structures that maximize the potential of the game, and show how the outcome of potential maximization depends on the players' Shapley values. We do not assume superadditivity and hence, potential-maximizing strategy profiles do not always involve full cooperation. In cases where full cooperation does result from potential maximization it can be inefficient. An example provides intuition.
 
 
Keywords: cooperation formation game
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 27 2003 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 28 2003

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