All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Akira Yamada
 
''Efficient equilibrium side contracts''
( 2003, Vol. 3 No.6 )
 
 
We analyze two-stage games where players may make binding offers of schemes for side payment acceptance (or rejection) as well as those for side payments before choosing actions. We find that any set of efficient actions maximizing the total payoff is played on an equilibrium path of the two-stage game when such bilateral contracts on side payments are interdependent.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Mar 14 2003 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 07 2003

  This abstract has been downloaded 798 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87700 times