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Frederick Chen
 
''Unraveling in a dynamic matching market with Nash bargaining''
( 2003, Vol. 3 No.17 )
 
 
Equilibrium sorting in a finite-horizon, two-sided matching market with heterogeneous agents is considered. It is shown that, if the match production function is additively separable in agent-types and if the division of match output is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, then an unraveling of the market obtains as the unique equilibrium in which all matches are formed in the first period.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 14 2003 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 28 2003

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