All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
David Cantala
 
''Matching Markets: the Particular Case of Couples''
( 2004, Vol. 3 No.45 )
 
 
We consider one-to-one markets where workers can apply to a centralized procedure either alone or as a couple, in order to reach a core- stable matching of firms and workers. We impose stringent restrictions on the preferences of couples capturing the fact that spouses want to live in the same region, which are shown to be incompatible with the guarantee of the existence of a stable matching.
 
 
Keywords: couples
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 28 2004 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 24 2004

  This abstract has been downloaded 698 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 87699 times