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ralph lauren polo

 
Alexander Zimper
 
''Equivalence between best responses and undominated strategies: a generalization from finite to compact strategy sets.''
( 2005, Vol. 3 No.7 )
 
 
For games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are finite, Pearce (1984) shows that a strategy is strictly dominated by some mixed strategy, if and only if, this strategy is not a best response to some belief about opponents' strategy choice. This note generalizes Pearce''s (1984) equivalence result to games with expected utility maximizing players whose strategy sets are arbitrary compact sets.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 23 2004 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 19 2005

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