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ralph lauren polo

 
Suren Basov
 
''Equilibrium selection in coordination games: Why do dominated strategies matter?''
( 2004, Vol. 3 No.41 )
 
 
In this paper I illustrate by an example that strictly dominated strategies may affect the process of the equilibrium selection in coordination games. The strategy profile that gets selected may be both Pareto and risk dominated. This distinguishes it from the examples provided in Ellison (2000) and Maruta (1997).
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 28 2004 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 28 2004

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