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Carmelo Rodriguez-Alvarez
 
''On the Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Coalition Formation Rules''
( 2004, Vol. 4 No.10 )
 
 
We analyze simple coalition formation problems in which a group of agents is partitioned into coalitions and agents' preferences only depend on the identity of the members of the coalition to which they belong. We study coaltion formation rules that associate to each profile of agents'' preferences a partition of the group of agents. Assuming that agents'' preferences are separable, we show that no coalition formation rule can satisfy the joint requirements of strategy-proofness, individual rationality, non-bossiness, and voters'' sovereignty.
 
 
Keywords: Coalition Formation Rule
JEL: D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jun 03 2004 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 07 2004

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