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X. Henry Wang and Judy Hsu
''On the Licensing of Innovations under Strategic Delegation''
( 2004, Vol. 12 No.6 )
This note uses a three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.
Keywords: licensing strategic delegation
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
Manuscript Received : Jun 03 2004 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 05 2004

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