All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC
ralph lauren polo

 
Mhand Fares
 
''Direct externalities, specific performance and renegotiation design''
( 2005, Vol. 3 No.28 )
 
 
This paper examines how the model of De Fraja [Games and Economic Behavior, 1999] can be amended after Che [Games and Economic Behavior, 2000] negative result. We mainly show that the optimal level of investments can be obtained with the specific performance contract considered by De Fraja if the renegotiation process does not follow the Hart-Moore procedure but allocates an extreme bargaining power.
 
 
Keywords: incomplete contract hold-up
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 05 2005 Manuscript Accepted : May 20 2005

  This abstract has been downloaded 1171 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 104266 times