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Denis Lescop
 
''Provision of club goods: cost sharing and selection of a provider''
( 2005, Vol. 3 No.25 )
 
 
This paper characterizes optimal mechanisms facilitating the cost sharing and the selection of a provider for a club good. These mechanisms are allocatively and Pareto efficient. However, it appears that transfers occur even when the good is not provided. This result is due to the weakening of the incentive notion to Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and to the balanced budget condition. This phenomena disappears if the setting is perfectly symmetric.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
H4 - Publicly Provided Goods: General
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 06 2005 Manuscript Accepted : May 05 2005

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