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Tomohiko Kawamori
 
''Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model''
( 2005, Vol. 3 No.43 )
 
 
This paper investigates a generalized Baron-Ferejohn model with different discount factors, different recognition probabilities and q-majority rule. In the paper, it is shown that if players are sufficiently patient, recognition probabilities are similar and the voting rule is not unanimous, each player's equilibrium payoff is inversely proportional to the ratio of the player''s discount factor to the harmonic mean of all players'' discount factors. This result implies the followings: (i) A less patient player obtains a greater payoff (ii) As a player slightly becomes more patient, her payoff becomes smaller (iii) The equilibrium payoffs do not depend on recognition probabilities and (iv) They do not also depend on q.
 
 
Keywords: Baron-Ferejohn model (Legislative bargaining)
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General
 
Manuscript Received : Sep 08 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 15 2005

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