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ralph lauren polo

 
Akira Yamada
 
''Alternate contracts for side payments''
( 2005, Vol. 3 No.46 )
 
 
We characterize efficient equilibrium outcomes of two-player games that remain equilibrium outcomes even when the two players may alternately make binding offers of strategy contingent side payments before the game is played. Our characterization result implies that alternately contracting for side payments has more efficiency of a certain type in equilibria than simultaneously side contracting which is analyzed by Jackson and Wilkie (2005).
 
 
Keywords: alternate contracts
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Jul 29 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 25 2005

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