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Harold Houba and Quan Wen
''On The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States''
( 2006, Vol. 3 No.3 )
Slantchev (2003, American Political Science Review, 97) studies a class of negotiation models to explain costly conflict between two completely informed nations. In one of his main propositions (Proposition 2.3), Slantchev provides a strategy profile to support the so-called extremal subgame perfect equilibrium, where one nation receives its lowest equilibrium payoff. By means of a counter example, we demonstrate the existence of an equilibrium with one nation's payoffs below the strategy profile provided in his Proposition 2.3 (Case 2).
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
Manuscript Received : Dec 22 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 25 2006

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