All Rights Reserved
AccessEcon LLC 2006, 2008.
Powered by MinhViet JSC

Indranil Chakraborty
''Salvaging The Linkage Principle In Private-Value Auction For A Single Object''
( 2005, Vol. 4 No.4 )
There are a number of examples in the auction literature (Perry and Reny, 1999, and Krishna, 2002) where releasing the seller's private information can lead to a lowering of expected revenue. On the other hand, releasing information always increases welfare. Levin and Smith (1994) point out that when entry is endogenous (and the entry decision is made before one observes one''s signal), revenue and welfare objectives coincide. Therefore, revealing information will always increase revenue when we can use entry fees to capture all bidders'' rents.
Keywords: Auctions
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : Mar 09 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Mar 10 2005

  This abstract has been downloaded 2073 times                The Full PDF of this paper has been downloaded 156026 times