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Frederique Bracoud
''Double Bertrand competition among intermediaries when consumers can default''
( 2007, Vol. 4 No.7 )
This paper models a sequential double price competition among intermediaries when their expected revenue per sale is affected by consumers' default. If this revenue is non-monotonic with the asking price, the Walrasian outcome may not be an equilibrium and demand rationing may emerge instead.
Keywords: Bertrand Competition
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 25 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Feb 21 2007

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