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Benoît Sévi and Fabrice Yafil
''A special case of self-protection: The choice of a lawyer''
( 2005, Vol. 4 No.6 )
Considering self-protection, it is a well-known result that an increase in risk aversion does not unambiguously lead to a higher level of effort. In this paper, we consider a particular case of self-protection, the choice of a lawyer, assuming a positive relation between legal expenses and probability of success. In this context, level of effort is strictly monotone in risk aversion. We show that, paradoxically, the level of effort is not systematically higher for an indemnified more risk-averse agent than for a non-indemnified less risk-averse agent.
Keywords: increase in risk aversion
JEL: D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Manuscript Received : Apr 06 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Apr 06 2005

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