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Tsung-Sheng Tsai
''Private Provision of Public Goods under Delegated Common Agency''
( 2005, Vol. 8 No.13 )
This paper considers a delegated common agent who produces a public good with private information regarding his cost. We show that truthful strategies are not optimal for principals, and that the agent enjoys some rent in equilibrium. It is not always that all principals make contributions: the number of contracts with positive contributions accepted by the agent in equilibrium is non-increasing as the agent becomes less efficient.
D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Manuscript Received : Aug 30 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Nov 01 2005

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