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Toshiyuki Fujita
 
''A comment on '''International Cooperation for Sale''''''
( 2006, Vol. 8 No.10 )
 
 
We reexamine the analysis of Barrett (2001), that explores the size of a self-enforcing international environmental agreements. Barrett stresses that the key feature to realize the self-enforcing agreement is asymmetries among countries, but we get the following results certain condition that usually does not hold is required for the Barrett's solution, so it is necessary to reconsider the model settings.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: H0 - Public Economics: General
C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
 
Manuscript Received : Dec 02 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 24 2006

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