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ralph lauren polo

 
Stephane Caprice
 
''Incentive to encourage downstream competition under bilateral oligopoly''
( 2005, Vol. 12 No.9 )
 
 
Consider the contracting problem of an input supplier dealing with several firms that compete in an output market. We show that, contrary to the key result of the previous literature, an input supplier's profit can increase with the number of downstream firms if the upstream firm is not a monopolist but instead competes with an alternative inferior supplier.
 
 
Keywords: bilateral oligopoly
JEL: L0 - Industrial Organization: General
L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies: General
 
Manuscript Received : May 09 2005 Manuscript Accepted : May 09 2005

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