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Gamal Atallah
 
''Research Joint Ventures Cartelization with Asymmetric R&D Spillovers''
( 2005, Vol. 12 No.18 )
 
 
The paper analyzes the profitability of R&D cooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is shown that a firm prefers R&D competition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization when the spillover rate of its competitor is sufficiently high. The equilibrium configuration is RJV cartelization for low spillover asymmetries, R&D competition for intermediate asymmetries, and R&D cartelization for high asymmetries.
 
 
Keywords: Asymmetric Spillovers
JEL: L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
O3 - Technological Change; Research and Development: General
 
Manuscript Received : Oct 08 2005 Manuscript Accepted : Oct 08 2005

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