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Toru Hokari, Seiji Murakoshi and Masaki Iimura
''Subgame-perfect market sharing agreements''
( 2007, Vol. 3 No.7 )
Jackson and Watts (2002, J Econ Theory) study a dynamic process of network formation assuming that each player is myopic. In this note, we study the same dynamic process but assume that each player is farsighted. In particular, we consider a finite-horizon version of such a dynamic process in a model of market sharing agreements introduced by Belleframme and Bloch (2004, Int Econ Review), and investigate which networks are likely to be realized when the number of the players is three.
Keywords: finite horizon
JEL: C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory:General
D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : Nov 27 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Jan 25 2007

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