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Terence Tai-Leung Chong
 
''Two-sided Matching, Who Marries Whom? And what Happens upon Divorce?''
( 2006, Vol. 4 No.21 )
 
 
Conventional two-sided matching game is a one-period game. In this note, we contribute to the existing literature by examining a multi-period two-sided matching problem allowing for the possibility of a divorce. We assume that the matching game is played repeatedly and the payoff matrix changes over time. It is shown that the rule of divorce will affect the equilibrium of a marriage game. An empirical implication of our result is that a country with a well-developed financial market will have a better marital outcome as compared to a less-developed country.
 
 
Keywords:
JEL: D0 - Microeconomics: General
K0 - Law and Economics: General (including Data Sources and Description)
 
Manuscript Received : Apr 14 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Jun 12 2006

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