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Thomas Riechmann
''Mixed motives in a Cournot game''
( 2006, Vol. 4 No.29 )
The paper analyzes a Cournot model with two types of firms: Maximizers of profits and maximizers of relative payoffs. It is shown that the equilibrium is located somewhere between the regular Cournot-Nash equilibrium and the competitive Walrasian (or Bertrand-) equilibrium.
Keywords: Bertrand Equilibrium
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
Manuscript Received : Sep 19 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Sep 20 2006

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