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Leandro Arozamena and Federico Weinschelbaum
''A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses''
( 2006, Vol. 4 No.24 )
We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.
Keywords: Auctions
JEL: D4 - Market Structure and Pricing: General
L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance: General
Manuscript Received : Jul 05 2006 Manuscript Accepted : Jul 05 2006

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